In light of the voting dispute, the court stated that “[d] the language of the subordination agreement governs the outcome of the bank`s right to repay a right of default, the language of the Bankruptcy Act regulates the determination of voting rights.” In support of its decision, the court cited a provision of the Bankruptcy Act, which states that “the holder of a claim . . . . may vote in favour of adopting or rejecting a plan,” and noted the parties` recognition that the youngest lender was the “holder” of the subordinate exercise. The court interpreted the provision of the bankruptcy code in the sense that only the actual holder of the right to vote had the right to vote. In particular, the court ruled that the Junior Lender could not rely on either the discovery provision or the 2004 bankruptcy rule to obtain a discovery against the senior Lender. The clear text of the subordination agreement, the court wrote, prevents the Junior Lender from suing the senior Lender “in one way or another to assert its rights.” According to the court, any act by the Junior Lender to obtain the discovery concerning senior debt is “a calculated, albeit intermediate, act to assert its claims against argon.” “It simply cannot be accepted,” the court wrote, “that [the Junior Lender] ask for the basic discovery; [it] cannot be considered irrational. Margon and the trusts also stated that they were acting on behalf of the estate in accordance with the agreed disposition and order and that the discovery they followed took place as part of an investigation into the estate`s claims. Therefore, their behaviour does not fall within the scope of the behaviour prescribed by subordination agreements. As the LaSalle court correctly established, a contractual transfer of voting rights should not be carried out if there is clear evidence that a debtor`s estate has sufficient assets to fully satisfy the priority debt and that the younger lender is entitled, as far as possible, to some distribution under a plan. At LaSalle, however, no evidence was provided that the debtor`s estate had sufficient assets to make a distribution to the junior lender. Nevertheless, the Tribunal found that the contractual transfer of voting rights in violation of the principles of the bankruptcy code was unenforceable. The Tribunal`s decision is debatable because it removes contractual rights negotiated between non-debtors, while the bankruptcy law requires that subordination agreements be enforceable to the same extent as the existing code.