Jonathan Matheson is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. He is the author of The Epistemology of Disagrement (Palgrave) and co-editor of The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (Oxford University Press). He has also written many articles on epistemology and religious philosophy. A child believes that hell is a real place in the center of the earth. You do not agree. This is a case where you disagree with someone you recognize as your epistemic subordinate in the question of whether ” (B) is true. They think Babe Ruth was the greatest baseball player of all time. We learn that a sports writer, who has written several books on the history of baseball, disagrees and says that somehow it was the greatest. In this case, you will notice that you do not agree with an epistemic superior in this matter, because you know that you are only an amateur when it comes to baseball. In a third case, you do not agree with your sister about the name of the city that visited your family on vacation when you were a child. You know from long experience that your memory in cases like this is about as reliable as you; it is a disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer. Understood as a case of disagreement, where friends have a record of being so good at such a calculation, and where neither party has reason to think that on this occasion one of the two parties is particularly strong or blunt, Christensen says that if he learns the disagreement on the shares, he should be significantly less confident that the shares are $43 and significantly more confident than they are $45. Indeed, he argues that these competing proposals should be about as credible.

In Elementary Math, it is not credible for Lackey that she should be less confident than 2/2/4, let alone share the difference with her interlocutor and suspend judgment on the case. In other words, the assertion is that “Equal Weight Views” make bad judgments in cases of “extreme disagreement.” What justifies treating Elementary Math differently from check case? According to Lackey, if you have discovered peer disagreement, you are quite justified in believing that the soon-to-be controversial proposal, and then after the discovery of little or no peer divergence of conciliation is necessary. Since Lackey has the right to believe that it is not necessary before he speaks to his colleague, Christensen was not allowed to believe that the shares were $43 before the disagreements were discovered, a great dispute was required. According to the view of justification, the degree of early justification determines the rational response to peer dissent. A strong justification for the belief in the goal proposition counts, because if you are related to the disagreement discovered, you now have reason to think that your interlocutor is not their peer. In Elementary Math, Lackey should clearly reconsider his view of his colleague`s epistemical position with respect to elementary mathematics.